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A B S T R A C T
Although the environmental benefit from implementing a climate tax is usually realized, the economic dividend
still remains a controversial issue warranting further research. This is because the impact of an environmental
policy on an economy-wide system will depend on factors that differ from one region to the next. In this paper,
we develop a static CGE model for Liberia that is capable of analyzing both a uniform and a partial carbon tax
policy. Under the uniform policy instituted to ensure mitigation in the range of 20–50%, an economic dividend is
found for energy, employment, and welfare. In particular, energy consumption increases by between 5 and
15.5%, respectively. Interestingly, under a second best policy which exempts economically strategic sectors from
the tax, no economic dividend is found for all three variables. This time, energy use declines by between 2 and
9%. These suggest that a uniform environmental tax policy is a more viable option for Liberia, in particular, as it
does not only generate economic dividend for employment and welfare, it also incentivizes Liberia's adoption
and use of renewable energy technologies. In general, based on the results obtained, further conditions for the
feasibility of a double dividend are proposed.
1. Introduction
Small developing countries, like their larger counterparts, face
several constraints in their drive for sustainable development. Among
the major concerns include ensuring stable growth and employment,
stabilizing the supply of energy, and promoting environmental sus-
tainability. While ensuring stable energy supply appears to provide a
good support for economic growth and employment, quite often, these
benefits come at the compromise of environmental standards.
A large body of literature now exists attempting to test the double
dividend hypothesis of an environmental policy. This hypothesis sug-
gests the possibility of obtaining both environmental and economic
benefits as a result of implementing an environmental tax policy and
subsequently recycling revenues derived to lower other preexisting
taxes (see Pearce, 1991; Grubb et al., 1993; Bovenberg and Goulder,
2002; Patuelli et al., 2005; Bento and Jacobsen, 2007; Fernández et al.,
2011). The environmental improvement is due to incentives from the
environmental tax while the economic benefits come from shifting from
higher perverting taxes to lower perverting ones. Other studies sup-
porting a double dividend from an environmental policy include
Takeda (2007); Bor and Huang (2010); Saveyn et al. (2011); Ciaschini
et al. (2012); Orlov and Grethe (2012); Orlov et al. (2013); Carbone
et al. (2013); Fraser and Waschik (2013); Allan et al. (2014); and
Pereira et al. (2016).
At the same time, some authors have found no evidence of the
double dividend (e.g. Lu et al., 2010; Li and Lin, 2013; Zhang et al.,
2016) while some have even ruled out such possibility (e.g. Oates,
1995; Goulder, 2013; Wesseh and Lin, 2016b).
In general, there remains huge disagreement among economists as
to the possibility of a double dividend. For instance, Freire-González
(2018) recent review of this literature shows only 55% on the affir-
mative suggesting that, although the environmental benefit from im-
plementing a climate policy is usually realized, the economic dividend
still remains a controversial issue warranting further research. This
assertion appears to be reasonable especially when one begins to see
that several factors (that may differ from one region to the next) would
influence the impact of a climate or environmental tax including the
manner in which the tax is designed and implemented, the structure of
the economic system, consumer preferences, and other sociopolitical
factors.
Moreover, Freire-González (2018) review finds only two studies for
South Africa and no existing publications for other African countries.
This clearly demonstrates a severe research gap for transitional
economies and underscores the need for further research which ac-
counts for the political and economic structures in these countries and
how these would be affected by carbon taxes and recycling options.
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Therefore, in this study, we contribute to this literature gap by de-
signing two climate policies (a first-best and a second-best policy) in
which to study the double dividend hypothesis from the perspective of
developing countries. In so doing, it offers new insights both in terms of
drawing consensus in the literature as well as suggesting further con-
ditions under which a double dividend may or may not be possible.
To address our research questions, a static1 computable general
equilibrium (CGE) model is developed for a small developing country
calibrated to the most recently available and consistent energy and
economic data for Liberia. Indeed, CGE models come in handy for this
purpose as they are suitable for analyzing a wide range of policy issues.
From economic integration to climate change problems, from tax re-
form strategies to assistance for developing countries, their applications
seem extensive (Hosoe et al., 2010). In fact, these methods have been
regarded as the most effective way in which to capture the essential
ingredients of an economic system (Dixon and Jorgenson, 2012).
Despite their demonstrated importance, to date, there currently
exists only two CGE models for Liberia. The first one evaluates policy
options for medium term growth and development (Dessus et al., 2012)
while the most recent one examines the economic impact of the 2014
ebola epidemic on various sectors of the Liberian economy (Cruz et al.,
2014). Because the only available national social accounting matrix
(SAM) for Liberia has no energy sectors, there has been no attempt on
the development of an energy-economy-environment CGE model for
Liberia despite the government's agenda to promote a low carbon
growth. Hence, this paper also contributes towards data issues and,
thus, makes CGE modeling of energy and climate policies possible for
Liberia and facilitates general conclusions for small developing coun-
tries having similar characteristics as Liberia.
Following this introduction, the rest of the paper proceeds as fol-
lows. Section 2 describes the micro and macroeconomics of the alge-
braic formulation of our model. Section 3 presents details on data
collection for construction of the SAM and shows how parameters have
been calibrated to the model. Section 4 formulates the policy scenarios
which span the major experiments carried out in our paper. Major re-
sults derived from the simulations are documented in section 5. Ro-
bustness tests showing how sensitive the results are to variation in key
parameter values are presented in section 6. Section 7 discusses the
implications of key findings for Liberia's energy supply, demand, and
environmental policy design. Section 8 draws the conclusions.
2. Structure of the model
The model2 presented here builds on the Liberian version of a
single-country CGE model which uses the Maquette for Millennium
Development Goal Simulations (see Dessus et al., 2012). We adjust this
model by extracting the energy sector and making several additions in
order to study the double dividend hypothesis and to suggest scenarios
for the existence of a double dividend. Other useful references for our
mathematical formulations includeCao et al., 2009 and Jorgenson and
Wilcoxen (1993).
2.1. The government and donors
In the Liberian model, the government includes donors due to their
significant economic role. In this model, the government receives rev-
enue from two main sources, namely: tax receipts and international
transfers. Tax receipts include both direct taxes (on capital, labor, di-
vidends, etc.) and indirect taxes (on production, commodities, etc.). The
government revenue function is given by:
= + + + + + + + +R K L D P M SS C O TRAN SubG T T T T T T T T (1)
where RG is revenue received by the government, KT is the tax on ca-
pital, LT is labor tax, DT are taxes paid by property owners and
shareholders, PT represent all forms of production and sales taxes, MT
are tariffs on imports, SST are social security contributions, CT is the
carbon tax, OT are other taxes, and TRAN refers to international or
donor transfers. Subsidies of all forms (Sub) are subtracted from the
government revenue.
The revenue source of the carbon tax summed over all j industries is
given by:
= + + +C P Q Q F P M M( )T
j
j
v
j j j
c
j j
mv
x j j j
mc
j
(2)
In equation (2), P Qjv j j is ad valorem carbon tax applied to the value
of output at producers’ prices, Qjc j is a unit carbon tax applied to the
volume of output, Fx is the exchange rate, F P Mjmv x j j is ad valorem
carbon tax on imports applied to the value of imports at import prices,
and Mjmc j is a unit carbon tax on imports applied to the volume of
imports.
As discussed in section 3, the model for Liberia has two energy
sectors, that is, electricity and petroleum. Because only the burning of
fossil fuels produces emissions, we model the carbon tax per unit pet-
roleum fuel in industry as the unit carbon tax in Liberian dollars per ton
of carbon multiplied by the emissions coefficient on petroleum in in-
dustry . This relationship is expressed as:
=jc j (3)
On the other hand, the government spends its income on con-
sumption, payments to households, and the provision of capital in order
to provide government services (investment). The government invest-
ment funding is supplemented by domestic and foreign borrowing. We
express the government expenditure function as follows:
= + + +EX G I HG G C G G (4)
EXG in the above is government expenditure,GG, IC , HG are government
consumption, investment and payments to households, respectively
while G represents government interest payments on its debts.
The government budget deficit ( G) is exogenously determined as
the difference between its expenditures and revenues and is given by:
=G EX RG G (5)
To ensure that spending remains within its means, the government
will either make adjustments within its budget, or mobilize additional
revenue. All simulations in this study have been implemented on the
basis of a revenue-neutral tax, that is, we hold fixed the quantity of
public goods provided and recycle any residual revenue.
2.2. The production technology
Liberian firms produce goods and services and sell their output ei-
ther at home or on the international market depending on the relative
prices. They are driven by a profit maximization motive and use their
revenue to cover their costs. Industry j output (Qj) is a function of ca-
pital (Kj), labor L( )j and energy K( )j expressed as:
=Q f K L E( , , )j j j j (6)
Gross profit of industry j ( )j is given by:
= P Q P K P L P Ej j j Kj j Lj j
i
Ei ij
(7)
PKj, PLj, and PEi are prices of the production factors. For the case of
Liberia, the last term represents petroleum and electricity and the in-
teraction between the two. Input demands are determined by first order
conditions from the maximization of equation (7) subject to equation
(6). To ensure sufficient flexibility in domestic production and improve
the empirical attractiveness of the model, we employ nested constant
1 Our main reason for a static approach is the lack of sufficient and reliable
data for Liberia which makes it difficult to establish economic trends.
2 More details of the mathematical formulation of the models are available
upon request from the authors.
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elasticity of substitution (CES) functional forms in which capital and
labor are combined in the first stage, and then energy is added in the
second stage K L E[( , ) ]. At the first level, output Yj is defined by:
= +Y B K L[ (1 ) ]j j j
1
(8)
where B is a technology parameter, is a share parameter, and gives
information on the elasticity of substitution. At the second level, the
first level CES function is nested into a function of Yj and Ej and is given
by:
= +Q A Y E[ (1 ) ]j j j
1
(9)
in the same manner, A is technical parameter, is share parameter and
provides information on the elasticity of substitution. Substituting
equation (8) into (9) yields:
= + +( )Q A B K L E[ (1 ) ] (1 )j j j j1
1
(10)
The use of these specifications allows for substitution between
labor, capital and energy inputs.3 More importantly, specifying tech-
nologies in this manner provides for inter-fuel substitution between
petroleum and electricity as well as substitution between energy and
other factors of production. Considering industry j output at producers’
price (P )j , the market price at which output is purchased (P )mj includes
the carbon tax and indirect taxes on output. This relationship is mod-
eled as:
= + + + +P P(1 )mj jp jsub jo jv j jc (11)
where j
p are all forms of production and sales taxes, jsub are production
subsidies, jo represent other taxes, and all other variables are the same
as defined earlier.
2.3. Goods and factor markets
In order for all markets to clear,4 prices are endogenous and made to
adjust in the model. Therefore, commodity i produced (Q )i should be
the same as the sum of intermediate Vj ij and final demands:
= + + +Q V C G Xi
j
ij i i i
(12)
Ci, Gi and Xi are households final consumption, government final con-
sumption, and exports of good i, respectively.
Consistent with the Liberian situation, labor is assumed to be per-
fectly mobile across sectors and influenced by real wage fluctuations,
and this brings supply and demand into equilibrium. Wage distribution
coefficients ( )jL are used to distribute real wage and equilibrium in the
labor market is established when labor demand by all industries equal
labor supply by households:
=L L
j
j
L
D S
(13)
Using distribution coefficients for capital rental price( )jK , the
market for capital adjusts in the same manner in which capital demand
equals capital supply:
=K KDj
j
j
K
j
(14)
2.4. Energy and emissions
Because we have pointed out that emissions are mainly due to the
burning of petroleum fuels for the case of Liberia, emissions are mod-
eled as externalities resulting from the use of these fuels. The equation
relating total carbon dioxide emissions and other externalities (CO2) to
various sources is given by:
= +CO Q X M( )
i
i i i
i
i i2
(15)
where i is the coefficient which represents emissions resulting from the
utilization of domestic commodity i while those coming from the con-
sumption of a unit import is given by the coefficient i.
2.5. The external sector
Imports are modeled as imperfect substitutes for domestic goods
and services. As a result, the supply of commodity i Q( )si is treated as an
Armington CES function of domestic production Q( )i and imports M( )i
given by:
= +Q Q M[ (1 ) ]si i i
1
(16)
We define the purchasing price of imports PM( )i as a function of the
foreign price (PMi ), import tariffs ( )im and value added tax on imports
( imvat), all multiplied by the relative price of the world( ). This re-
lationship is expressed as:
= + +PM PM(1 )i im imvat i (17)
On the other hand, exports depend on domestic prices compared
with world prices. These prices are adjusted for export subsidies.
2.6. Final demand
Households in Liberia receive income N( ) from the supply of
labor N( )L less income taxes and social security contributions. In addi-
tion, households derive income from dividend payments N( )DIV less
dividend taxes. Other incomes for Liberian households come from
government transfers and interest on government bonds (N )G , social
security payments to households (N )SS , and remittances (N )R . Other fee
payments (N )O to government by households is deducted from house-
holds’ disposable income. This is given by:
= + + + +N N N N N N NL DIV G SS R O (18)
Liberian households spend their income on the consumption of
goods and services in order to derive utility. The representative con-
sumer welfare is studied by a nested CES utility function parallel to the
production technology described in equations (6)–(10). Utility is given
by:
= … =
=
U U C C µ C( , , )n
i
n
i
s
i
s
s
s
s
1
1
1 ( 1) ( 1)
(19)
Households demand for commodity i (C )i is given by the first order
conditions from equation (19).
3. Data and parameter calibration
3.1. The data
In order to develop the model, a number of parameter values have
to be estimated based on real data. This estimation process consists of
first collecting information on a certain base year to construct a SAM
and then use this SAM to estimate the model by a method called cali-
bration.
This study adopts and modifies the most recent and available
Liberian SAM developed by Fofana et al. (2014) of base year 2009
3 A distinction is made between feedstocks and fuels. It is necessary to dis-
tinguish between types of energy inputs since only the burning of fossil fuels
generates carbon emissions.
4 Investments also equal savings in this model.
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which uses data from the 2011 African Statistical Yearbook. The SAM
has no energy sectors and constitutes activities such as agriculture,
forestry, mining, industry, trade, and services. To satisfy the purpose in
this study, we make use of additional data from the U.S. Energy In-
formation Administration (EIA) and the Central Bank of Liberia (CBL)
to disaggregate Liberia's SAM into a matrix that would include the two
most important energy activities in the country, i.e., electricity (do-
mestic production) and refined imported petroleum (Wesseh et al.,
2013; Lin et al., 2014). As we show in Table 1, this modified and dis-
aggregated SAM is then grouped into four sectors for application to the
model namely: energy sectors (ES), sectors exempted from carbon taxes
(XEM), rest of industry (ROI), and final demand (FD).
Table 2 provides a summary of the economic data and emissions
pattern by sector and energy good in the benchmark year (which
happens to be 2009 in this paper). Monetary flows of Liberia's national
SAM are combined with petroleum which is used to produce energy-
and sector-specific CO2 emissions coefficients.5 The information in
Table 2 should be considered when interpreting the results of this study.
As may be noticed, sectors that are potentially exempted from carbon
taxes under a second best policy account for approximately 27.5% of
gross output, 63% of wages, and 1.5% of carbon emissions.
At a first glance, the small fraction of the exempted sectors in pol-
lution would suggest that a policy which exempts strategic sectors will
have marginal impacts on overall welfare. Indeed, the amount of
emissions per output is larger for the non-exempted sectors. This im-
plies that the scope of CO2 substitution possibilities in exempted sectors
is potentially lower than the rest of industry. Such an understanding is
important because, for exogenous reduction targets, exempting high
polluting sectors could raise the costs to sectors that are not exempted
from the tax.
3.2. Calibration
Since CGE modeling usually involves small observations but several
parameters to be estimated, standard econometric techniques break-
down due to insufficient degree of freedom. Hence, the method of ca-
libration comes in handy (Hosoe et al., 2010). Given the benchmark
data in the national SAM constructed for purpose of this study, share
parameters required for the algebraic formulation in some equations in
the models are calibrated. However, most of the parameter values, in-
cluding taxes, are based on information within the SAM. Based on the
literature, we assume the Armington elasticity of substitution to be 4
and take the energy-other goods elasticity as 0.5.
4. Policy scenarios
One of the major goals of the Liberian government climate and
energy policy is to implement a strategy that would make Liberia a
carbon-neutral country and eventually less carbon dependent by the
year 2050 (Wesseh and Zoumara, 2012). In line with this objective our
paper considers, for each carbon tax policy, mitigation rates of 20, 40,
and 50% from the benchmark. It is important to remind readers that all
simulations are perform under the assumption that the government
would redistribute income from the environmental tax.
The first best scenario considers a uniform environmental tax policy
in which an economy-wide tax is levied on CO2 resulting from the
combustion of fossil fuel in domestic production and consumption.
Emissions in imports are also included and for exported goods, there are
no rebates of carbon taxes paid on inputs.
Notwithstanding, in order to avoid adverse output and energy
shocks and to lend support for environmental objectives, imposing
environmental taxes with preferential treatment or, in this case, ex-
emptions for sectors considered to be strategically critical for economic
development could provide opportunities. Considering the situation in
Liberia for instance where several years of civil conflict destroyed much
of the economy and energy infrastructure, the current leadership under
President George Weah has promised to implement series of “pro-poor”
measures in which agriculture and industry would form the bedrock of
these strategies. Indeed, the agricultural and industrial sectors have
great significance for alleviating poverty and creating jobs in Liberia.
This is demonstrated by the fact that, even at perhaps one the lowest
productive rates ever, these two sectors combined still constitute about
27.5% of total output and 63% of aggregate employment (Fofana et al.,
2014). Therefore, with measures in place to ensure stable energy supply
to these two sectors, policy makers in Liberia predict that the country
would expedite and fortify its chances of achieving the government's
2030 target of alleviating poverty and expanding output.
For the above reason, a second best policy which exempts6 selected
sectors (agriculture and industry in this case) is considered. Exemptions
would imply an increase in carbon taxes for the remaining sectors.
5. Major results
5.1. A uniform environmental tax and the double dividend
The first best policy in which an economy-wide tax is levied to
Table 1
Sectors of the model.
Initial SAM Modified SAM Mapping a
Agriculture Agriculture XEM
Industry Industry
– Petroleum ES
– Electricity
Forestry Forestry ROI
Mining Mining
Trade Trade
Services Services
Household Household FD
Government & Donors Government & Donors
Investment Investment
External External
a Note: XEM, ES, ROI, and FD refer to exempted sectors from taxes, energy
sectors, rest of industry, and final demand, respectively.
Table 2
Summary benchmark data for 2009 (billion Liberian dollar) b.
Source: Fofana et al. (2014), Wesseh et al. (2013), and Authors' own compu-
tations
XEM ES ROI FD Total
Economic data
Output 193.4
(27.5%)
38.9
(5.5%)
169.3
(24%)
300.8
(43%)
702.4
(100%)
Employment 29.5 (63%) 0.5 (1%) 17 (36%) – 47 (100%)
Carbon emissions in thousand metric tons CO2 (Total: 706)
Petroleum 10.5 (1.5%) 395 (56%) 297 (42%) 3.5 (0.5%) 706 (100%)
b Note: XEM, ES, ROI, and FD are the same as defined earlier.
5 The CO2 emissions coefficients here refer to metric tons of CO2 per unit
Liberian dollar of petroleum used in a specific sector. It should be pointed out
that these coefficients serve as the base for the government's levy of carbon
taxes in this study.
6 The problem, however, is that, exemptions can be environmentally costly
and could increase the burden of cutbacks to non-exempted sectors especially if
the exempted sectors are highly carbon intensive (Kasa, 2000).
Notwithstanding, exemptions from carbon taxes intended to stabilize the supply
of energy and output can still be viewed as an attractive option for many de-
veloping countries (including Liberia) whose thin financial resources cannot
sustain the costs associated with adopting renewable energy technologies at
scale to replace traditional fossil fuels (Wesseh and Lin, 2016a).
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ensure carbon emission reductions between 20 to 50% is documented in
Table 3. It shows a rise in employment, energy demand, and welfare.
The positive changes in these variables are somehow proportionate to
the rate of carbon emission reduction with higher emission reduction
rate corresponding to higher gains in employment, energy demand, and
welfare. This rise in energy demand is inconsistent with the stated
purpose of the energy tax. In fact, we notice that the rise in energy
demand (5.1–15.5%) and employment (2.1–13.3%) lead to welfare
gains in the range of 4.3–8.8% corresponding to 20 and 50% emissions
reduction, respectively. These results are as well supportive of the
causal relationship between energy consumption and economic growth
reported in the energy economics literature.
In summary, there appears to be a double dividend for employment,
energy, and welfare under a uniform environmental tax policy im-
plemented for Liberia. We discuss these results in details in section 7.
5.2. A partial environmental tax and the double dividend
To study the costs and/or benefits of a second best policy which
exempts targeted sectors (agriculture and industry in this case), the
results in Table 4 are presented. To the contrary, exempting agriculture
and industry from the tax leads to decline in employment levels, energy
demand, and welfare. As may be noticed from Table 4, the corre-
sponding decline in employment, energy demand, and welfare as a
result of the 20–50% emissions reductions ranges between approxi-
mately 4 and 13%, 2 and 9%, and 2 and 8%, respectively. Again, the
implications of these results are discussed at length in section 7.
6. Sensitivity analysis
Since most of the models’ parameters are either based on informa-
tion in the SAM or calibrated, our sensitivity analysis focuses on critical
parameters whose values have been assumed based on the literature. In
particular, we evaluate the effects of three economic assumptions on
our conclusions namely: Armington assumption, substitution between
energy and other goods, and the magnitude of exemption. For simpli-
city, we treat one assumption at a time while taking the others as given.
6.1. Armington elasticity
Given that imports and exports are critical to our model formula-
tion, it is understandable that the Armington constant elasticity of
substitution and constant elasticity of transformation would be of im-
portance to our sensitivity analysis. The simulation results reported in
Tables 3 and 4 are representative of an Armington elasticity greater
than 1 =( 4) in order to bring about some form of substitution between
domestic and imported goods. As a result, this would ensure that any
tariffs on imports would lead to an increase in domestic production and,
as such, welfare gains would still be guaranteed (see Zhang, 2006).
Therefore, we first examine the sensitivity of the results in Tables 3 and
4 to changes in the level of the Armington elasticity by considering two
additional cases; one in which Armington elasticity is equivalent to 1
=( 1), and another in which Armington elasticity is less than 1
=( 0.5).
Results from varying the parameter associated with Armington
elasticity are reported in Table 5 for the two policy scenarios we have
tested under all three mitigation levels (20, 40, and 50% CO2 mitiga-
tion). Even though slight variations in magnitudes are observed for
various coefficients, the general conclusions regarding the im-
plementation of carbon taxes in Liberia, be it uniform or partial, remain
unchanged.
6.2. Energy to other goods substitution elasticity
The framework we develop in this study has utilized CES technol-
ogies which allow for substitution between energy goods (petroleum
and electricity in our case) as well as for substitution between energy
and other goods. Because carbon taxes are levied directly on the con-
sumption of petroleum in our model, the substitution elasticity between
energy and other goods becomes a critical factor. We have already in-
dicated that the simulation results in Tables 3 and 4 are based on en-
ergy-other good elasticity of 0.5 =( 0.5). To examine how the results
are affected by this parameter value, we evaluate a situation in which
gamma is less than 0.5 =( 0.2)as well as one in which gamma is
greater than 0.5 =( 1). The results from this exercise are presented in
Table 3
A uniform environmental tax and the double dividend (% change).
CO2 reduction rate Employment Energy Welfare
20 2.1 5.1 4.3
40 6.2 12.6 7.9
50 13.3 15.5 8.8
Table 4
A partial environmental tax and the double dividend (% change).
CO2 reduction rate Employment Energy Welfare
20 −3.9 −2.2 −1.5
40 −6.5 −5.4 −2.8
50 −13.3 −9.1 −7.6
Table 5
Sensitivity of results to changes in Armington elasticity.
Energy
Uniform Partial
CO2 reduction rate 20% 40% 50% 20% 40% 50%
Baseline case =( 4) 5.1 12.6 15.5 −2.2 −5.4 −9.1
Unitary elasticity =( 1) 4.8 11.3 13.9 −2.6 −4.8 −8.7
Small elasticity =( 0.5) 5.3 12.4 14.8 −1.9 −5.5 −9.8
Welfare
CO2 reduction rate 20% 40% 50% 20% 40% 50%
Baseline case =( 4) 4.3 7.9 8.8 −1.5 −2.8 −7.6
Unitary elasticity =( 1) 4.4 6.6 8.3 −1.8 −2.4 −6.6
Small elasticity =( 0.5) 4.9 7.2 7.6 −2.1 −3.1 −7.1
Employment
CO2 reduction rate 20% 40% 50% 20% 40% 50%
Baseline case =( 4) 2.1 6.2 13.3 −3.9 −6.5 −13.3
Unitary elasticity =( 1) 1.8 6.9 12.6 −3.3 −6.8 −12.2
Small elasticity =( 0.5) 2.3 5.8 11.9 −3.6 −5.5 −12.6
Table 6
Sensitivity of results to changes in Armington elasticity.
Energy
Uniform Partial
CO2 reduction rate 20% 40% 50% 20% 40% 50%
Baseline case =( 4) 5.1 11.6 15.5 −2.2 −5.4 −9.1
Unitary elasticity =( 1) 4.2 10.5 12.2 −2.1 −4.2 −7.7
Small elasticity =( 0.5) 5.1 11.8 14.1 −2.4 −5.1 −9.3
Welfare
CO2 reduction rate 20% 40% 50% 20% 40% 50%
Baseline case =( 4) 4.3 7.9 8.8 −1.5 −2.8 −7.6
Unitary elasticity =( 1) 5.2 6.1 8.4 −1.1 −2.6 −6.2
Small elasticity =( 0.5) 4.6 7.8 7.1 −2.8 −3.5 −7.8
Employment
CO2 reduction rate 20% 40% 50% 20% 40% 50%
Baseline case =( 4) 2.1 6.2 13.3 −3.9 −6.5 −13.3
Unitary elasticity =( 1) 2.2 6.2 12.1 −3.6 −6.2 −12.1
Small elasticity =( 0.5) 2.6 5.4 11.4 −3.4 −5.3 −12.5
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Table 6. Again as we notice form Table 6, whether theta is 0.5, 0.2, or 1,
the signs of all coefficients remain unchanged with all values fluctu-
ating within a reasonable interval. Similar observation is made for both
policy options, i.e., a uniform carbon tax and a carbon tax with ex-
emption for the agricultural and industrial sectors.
6.3. Number of exempted sectors
In our baseline simulations, exemption of the agricultural and in-
dustrial sectors from carbon taxes does seem to create significant excess
costs compared with the uniform tax scenario. In order to objectively
evaluate the possibility of any excess costs arising from exemption, we
consider another scenario in which the mining sector is included with
the exempted sectors. This new qualification raises the share of ex-
empted sectors in CO2 emissions from 1.5% (Table 2) to approximately
22%. Interestingly, we find similar results as in Tables 5 and 6 That is,
despite increasing the number of exempted sectors, and hence in-
creasing the share of exempted sectors in economic activities and
emissions, there remains economic dividend for energy, employment,
and welfare under the uniform environmental tax policy, and no divi-
dend for these variables under the partial tax policy.
7. Discussion
As pressure to promote a low carbon growth intensifies, govern-
ments and policy makers remain committed to identifying the most
effective mechanism for abatement. Quite often, a carbon tax has been
considered as that ‘single better’ mechanism for abatement in the
carbon tax literature (Wesseh and Lin, 2018) although not without its
own disadvantages. For this reason, a number of developing countries
are now considering, if not already in full swing, the implementation of
carbon taxes either in isolation or in combination with other policy
instruments.
Consistent with the Liberian government's effort to mitigate climate
change and, at the same time, boost economic activities, this paper has
tested and pointed to evidence of the existence of both an environ-
mental and an economic dividend from implementing an economy-
wide carbon tax policy in Liberia. In particular, the economic dividend
is found for energy, employment, and welfare.
First, a cursory look at these results show that the rise in energy
demand is inconsistent with the stated purpose of the energy tax.
However, further analysis reveals that implementing a uniform carbon
tax in Liberia raises the costs of fossil fuels to levels that sufficiently
increase the competitiveness of renewable energy technologies to en-
trepreneurs in Liberia. At the same time, under the Liberian government
target to increase the rural electrification rate by 35% by 2030 driven
by donor support and public expenditures on renewable energy, it is
anticipated that a carbon tax policy will incentivize renewable energy
investment by about $ 550 million to grow the national grid (EU, 2018).
These twin capital flows to clean technologies (by the private sector on
the one hand due to competitiveness derived from the carbon tax on
fossil fuels and the public sector and donors on the other hand) sub-
stantially increase the penetration of clean energy into the energy
supply mix. This increased supply then induces demand. Moreover, the
huge adoption of renewable energy technologies has implications for
reducing other greenhouse gas emissions resulting from the burning of
fossil fuels (such as nitrous oxide or N2O). On the contrary, such ex-
pansion in renewable energy technologies could also give rise to the
emissions of methane (CH4) especially when portion of the renewable
energy comes from biomass related sources – something which is true
for Liberia.
Second, the economic dividend found for employment is also in-
tuitive. On the one hand, the huge infusion of clean energy into the
energy mix creates new jobs from the introduction of new technologies.
On the other hand, and perhaps most importantly, the environmental
tax reduces real wage so much that labor supply increases to make up
for the lost income. Another way to view this is that the environmental
tax will lower real wage below the actual amount of the tax and this
will reduce the labor costs for firms. The reduced labor costs will raise
firms demand for workers and households will supply this demand due
to the high costs of living and inherent unemployment issues in Liberia.
Our explanation for the employment dividend in Liberia is different
from the traditional view that the employment dividend is due to
taxation shifts. This implies that revenues from the environmental tax
are used to lower labor taxes thereby raising income. On the contrary,
we argue in this paper that households will not always supply their
labor because of high income especially when the labor tax is marginal
or even nonexistent as is the case with Liberia. As a result, we propose
further condition for the employment dividend such that: if there is no
labor tax but high costs of living and inherent unemployment issues,
then the employment dividend of an environmental tax is feasible.
Third, the corresponding rise in employment and energy demand
would justify the strong economic dividend found in this study, that is,
the welfare dividend.
Interestingly, under a second best policy in which targeted sectors
like agriculture and industry are exempted from the environmental tax,
no economic dividend is found for employment, energy, and welfare.
Instead, the environmental tax rather causes a decline in all of these
variables.
In trying to understand these results, one must not forget that ex-
emptions would imply an increase in carbon taxes for the remaining
model sectors such as petroleum, electricity, forestry, mining, trade,
services, investment, household, government & donors, and the ex-
ternal sector. This raises the production costs to these sectors and thus
lowers their competitiveness especially on the international market.
This is because the environmental tax is so high to the point that real
wage is unable to reduce below the amount of the tax. For the case of
Liberia, since the protected sectors (agriculture and industry) con-
tribute much lower to the nation's real GDP than most of the other non-
protected model sectors, raising the production costs of non-protected
sectors leads to a decline in employment and energy, and this results in
welfare losses of Liberians. Hence, this paper hypothesizes, also, that a
double dividend may not be achieved if there are environmental tax
exemptions for weaker sectors which raises the production costs of non-
exempted sectors thereby reducing their international competitiveness.
8. Conclusions
In this paper, we have developed a static CGE model calibrated to
2009 and 2011 Liberian data designed to study the implications of both
uniform and partial carbon tax policies for sectors considered to be
strategically important for economic development in Liberia. Given
Liberia's insignificance in terms of global emissions, we assume that
carbon emissions reduction in Liberia does not induce significant
changes of carbon emissions globally. Our simulation exercises point to
the following major insights:
First, under a uniform carbon tax policy instituted to ensure miti-
gation in the range of 20–50%, an economic dividend is found for en-
ergy, employment, and welfare. The energy dividend is due to increased
private and public sectors capital flows to renewable7 energy technol-
ogies due to their costs competitiveness driven by higher fossil fuels
costs. The employment dividend is driven by jobs creation from in-
vestment in renewable energy technologies and the fact that the en-
vironmental tax reduces real wage so much that labor supply increases
7 This competitive nature of renewable energy technologies is supported by
the fact that Liberia has higher potential for renewable energy sources relative
to nonrenewable energy sources (Wesseh and Zoumara, 2012; Wesseh et al.,
2013). It is therefore not surprising why hydropower alone constitutes more
than 65% of total installed capacity (see the United States Development Aid
website at: https://www.usaid.gov/powerafrica/liberia).
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to make up for the lost income. The welfare dividend comes from the
rise in employment levels and energy use.
Second, under a second best policy of partial tax exemption for
economically strategic sectors, no economic dividend is found for em-
ployment, energy, and welfare. Instead, the environmental tax rather
causes a decline in all of these variables.
Third, our results suggest two conditions under which a double di-
vidend may or may not be possible. The first condition surrounds the
employment dividend. It suggests that: if there is no labor tax but high
costs of living and inherent unemployment issues, then the employment
dividend of an environmental tax is feasible. The second condition
concerns the non-feasibility of a double dividend. It suggests that: a
double dividend may not be achieved if there are environmental tax
exemptions for weaker sectors which raises the production costs of non-
exempted sectors thereby reducing their international competitiveness.
Sensitivity analysis performed to evaluate how the results vary with
changes in key parameters suggests that, even though slight variations
in magnitudes are observed for various coefficients, the general con-
clusions regarding the implementation of carbon taxes in Liberia, be it
uniform or partial, remain unchanged.
In light of the results presented in this study, the best policy choice
is the implementation of a uniform environmental tax. This will not
only generate economic dividend for employment and welfare, it will as
well incentivize the expansion of renewable energy technologies.
Acknowledgments
This research is supported by the Fundamental Research Funds for
the Central Universities (No. 0610/ZK1102), funding offered by the
School of Management at Xiamen University (No. 0610-X2100702),
Report Series from Ministry of Education of China (No.10JBG013), and
China National Social Science Fund (No. 17AZD013).
References
Cruz, M., Evans, D.K., Ferreira, F., Lofgren, H., Maliszewska, M., Over, M., 2014.
Estimating the Economic Impact of the Ebola Epidemic: Evidence from Computable
General Equilibrium Models. World Bank Paper Available at: https://
editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=CSAE2015&
paper_id=981, Accessed date: 8 July 2018.
Dessus, S., Hoffman, J., Lofgren, H., 2012. Strategic policy options for medium term
growth and development. In: World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 6081,
Available at: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/
16223/WPS6081.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y, Accessed date: 8 July 2018.
Fofana, I., Balma, L., Traore, F., Kane, D., 2014. 2009 Social Accounting Matrix for
Liberia, International Food Policy Research Institute. Available at: http://www.
agrodep.org/dataset/2009-social-accounting-matrix-sam-liberia, Accessed date: 5
July 2018.
Allan, G., Lecca, P., McGregor, P., Swales, K., 2014. The economic and en-
vironmentalimpact of a carbon tax for Scotland: A computable general equilibrium
analysis. Ecol. Econ. 100, 40–50.
Bento, A.M., Jacobsen, M., 2007. Ricardian rents, environmental policy and the ‘double-
dividend’ hypothesis. J. Environ. Econ. Manag. 53, 17–31.
Bor, Y.J., Huang, Y., 2010. Energy taxation and the double dividend effect in Taiwan's
energy conservation policy—an empirical study using a computable general equili-
brium model. Energy Policy 38 (5), 2086–2100.
Bovenberg, A.L., Goulder, L.H., 2002. Environmental taxation and regulation. In:
Auerbach, A., Feldstein, M. (Eds.), Handbook of Public Economics. Elsevier,
Amsterdam, North Holland, pp. 1471–1545.
Cao, J., Ho, M.S., Jorgenson, D.W., 2009. The local and global benefits of green tax po-
licies in China. Rev. Environ. Econ. Policy 3, 189–208.
Carbone, J., Morgenstern, R.D., Williams III, R.C., Burtraw, D., 2013. Deficit reduction
and carbon taxes: Budgetary, economic, and distributional impacts. Available at:
https://www.rff.org/publications/reports/deficit-reduction-and-carbon-taxes-
budgetary-economic-and-distributional-impacts/.
Ciaschini, M., Pretaroli, R., Severini, F., Socci, C., 2012. Regional double dividend from
environmental tax reform: an application for the Italian economy. Res. Econ. 66 (3),
273–283.
Dixon, P.B., Jorgenson, D.W., 2012. Handbook of Computable General Equilibrium
Modeling. Newnes.
European Union (EU), 2018. Rural Energy Strategy and Master Plan for Liberia until
2030.
Fernández, E., Pérez, R., Ruiz, J., 2011. Optimal green tax reforms yielding double di-
vidend. Energy Policy 39, 4253–4263.
Fraser, I., Waschik, R., 2013. The double dividend hypothesis in a CGE model: specific
factors and the carbon base. Energy Econ. 39, 283–295.
Freire-González, J., 2018. Environmental taxation and the double dividend hypothesis in
CGE modelling literature: a critical review. J. Policy Model. 40, 194–223.
Goulder, L.H., 2013. Climate change policy's interactions with the tax system. Energy
Econ. 40 S3–S11.
Grubb, M., Edmonds, J., en Brink, P., Morrison, M., 1993. The cost of limiting fossil-fuel
CO 2 emissions. Annu. Rev. Energy Environ. 18, 397–478.
Hosoe, N., Gasawa, K., Hashimoto, H., 2010. Textbook of Computable General
Equilibrium Modeling. Palgrave Macmillan.
Jorgenson, D.W., Wilcoxen, P.J., 1993. Reducing U.S. carbon emissions: an econometric
general equilibrium assessment. Resour. Energy Econ. 14, 243–268.
Li, A., Lin, B., 2013. Comparing climate policies to reduce carbon emissions in China.
Energy Policy 60, 667–674.
Lin, B., Wesseh, P.K., Owusu Appiah, M., 2014. Oil price fluctuation, volatilityspillover
and the Ghanaian equity market: Implication for portfolio management and hedging
effectiveness. Energy Econ 42, 172–182.
Lu, C., Tong, Q., Liu, X., 2010. The impacts of carbon tax and complementary policies on
Chinese economy. Energy Policy 38 (11), 7278–7285.
Oates, W.E., 1995. Green taxes: can we protect the environment and improve the tax
system at the same time? South. Econ. J. 61 (4), 915–922.
Orlov, A., Grethe, H., 2012. Carbon taxation and market structure: a CGE analysis for
Russia. Energy Policy 51, 696–707.
Orlov, A., Grethe, H., McDonald, S., 2013. Carbon taxation in Russia: prospects for a
double dividend and improved energy efficiency. Energy Econ. 37, 128–140.
Patuelli, R., Nijkamp, P., Pels, E., 2005. Environmental tax reform and the double divi-
dend: A meta-analytical performance assessment. Ecol. Econ. 55, 564–583.
Pearce, D., 1991. The role of carbon taxes in adjusting to global warming. Econ. J. 101,
938–948.
Pereira, A.M., Pereira, R.M., Rodrigues, P.G., 2016. A new carbon tax in Portugal: a
missed opportunity to achieve the triple dividend? Energy Policy 93, 110–118.
Saveyn, B., Van Regemorter, D., Ciscar, J.C., 2011. Economic analysis of the climate
pledges of the Copenhagen accord for the EU and other major countries. Energy Econ.
33, S34–S40.
Takeda, S., 2007. J. Jpn. Int. Econ. 21, 336–364.
Wesseh, P.K., Lin, B., 2016a. Can African countries efficiently build their economies on
renewable energy? Renewable and Sustainable Energy Rev 54, 161–173.
Wesseh, P.K., Zoumara, B., 2012. Causal independence between energy consumption and
economic growth in Liberia: evidence from a non-parametric bootstrapped causality
test. Energy Policy 50, 518–527.
Wesseh, P.K., Lin, B., 2016b. Modeling environmental policy with and without abatement
substitution: a tradeoff between economics and environment? Appl. Energy 167,
34–43.
Wesseh, P.K., Lin, B., 2018. Optimal carbon taxes for China and implications for power
generation, welfare, and the environment. Energy Policy 118, 1–8.
Wesseh, P.K., Lin, B., Appiah, M.O., 2013. Delving into Liberia's energy economy: tech-
nical change, inter-factor and inter-fuel substitution. Renew. Sustain. Energy Rev. 24,
122–130.
Zhang, S.G., 2006. Armington elasticities and terms of trade effects in global cge models.
In: Productivity Commission Staff Working Paper, (Melbourne, January).
Zhang, X., Guo, Z., Zheng, Y., Zhu, J., Yang, J., 2016. A CGE analysis of the impacts of a
carbon tax on provincial economy in China. Emerg. Mark. Finance Trade 52 (6),
1372–1384.
P.K. Wesseh and B. Lin Energy Policy 134 (2019) 110947
7
